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THIRD TIME’S A CHARM: THE CASE FOR BAN THE BOX
LEGISLATION IN IDAHO

ALAINA HEURING*
ABSTRACT
A growing chorus of legislative bodies have enacted legislation
signaling an about-face to the nation’s “tough on crime” criminal
justice approach. Ban the box legislation, which prohibits employers’
ability to inquire into a job applicant’s criminal history, has found a
home in the majority of U.S. states’ laws today. The ban the box
movement seeks to reduce imprisonment rates by connecting exoffenders with more employment opportunities upon release from
prison. The Idaho Legislature has twice turned down opportunities to
join this growing majority, despite mounting pressure to correct
Idaho’s mass-incarceration crisis.
This Comment begins by analyzing the significance of a criminal
conviction and the vicious cycle of unemployment and recidivism that
often results upon a prisoner’s release. With this in mind, this
Comment addresses the judicial and legislative responses to
discriminatory hiring practices observed by ex-offenders, focusing on
Title VII and ban the box laws. This Comment then turns to Idaho and
evaluates two recent bills proposed in the Idaho Legislature that
sought to “ban the box.” Finally, this Comment advocates for adoption
of an aggressive ban the box law in Idaho to reduce the state’s rising
incarceration rate.

* J.D. Candidate, University of Idaho College of Law, 2022.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-six states1 and over 150 U.S. cities have adopted “ban the box” laws to
provide ex-offenders a fair chance at employment. 2 Ban the box laws, otherwise
known as fair chance laws, prohibit employers from asking job applicants about
their criminal history on an initial job application.3 Indeed, the “box” in “ban the
box” represents the blank field on many employment applications where applicants
place a checkmark to indicate that they have been convicted of a crime.

1. BETH AVERY & HAN LU, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES TO
ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS, 2-3 (2020). A total of thirty-six
states have adopted laws applicable to public-sector employment: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Some of these states have adopted policies that
extend to private employers, too.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 3.
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At its core, this movement seeks to ensure that employers judge candidates
by their work qualifications rather than their past mistakes. Research demonstrates
that ex-offenders desperately need such protection; in fact, an applicant’s
likelihood of receiving a mere callback is reduced by nearly fifty percent once the
applicant discloses her criminal record.4 The practice of blanket rejecting all exoffenders’ detriments all participants in the hiring process: employers thus
artificially narrow their applicant pool, while ex-offenders grow discouraged and
tend to reoffend.5
Idaho has twice missed its chance to ban the box.6 Following the failure of
Idaho’s first fair chance bill in 2018, Idaho Senator Cherie Buckner-Webb (D-19)
introduced a second fair chance bill in 2020.7 Senate Bill 1318 sought to curb Idaho’s
climbing incarceration rate, a figure undeterred by previous prison reform
legislation.8 Treatment of Senate Bill 1318 was promising. Idaho’s Senate Judiciary
Committee unanimously endorsed the Bill, and it soon passed the Senate floor with
bipartisan support.9 Ultimately, however, Senate Bill 1318 died in the House.10 This
Comment recommends that Idaho legislators revisit fair chance policies for the
third and final time—and ultimately join the growing majority11 of ban the box
jurisdictions.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the circumstances that
have combined to create poor employment prospects for ex-offenders nationwide.
Part I continues with a discussion of ex-offenders’ attempts to challenge
discriminatory hiring practices under Title VII, which serves as a backdrop to the
ban the box movement. Part II surveys other states’ fair chance laws and compares
them against Idaho’s two unenacted fair chance bills. Part III questions the rationale
of ban the box legislation and discusses emerging studies attempting to test the
efficacy of these laws. Finally, Part IV contemplates Idaho’s mass incarceration crisis
and concludes that ban the box would appropriately reduce the state’s rising
recidivism rates.
II. BACKGROUND

4. Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and
White Men with Criminal Records, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 199 (2009).
5. NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, FACT SHEET: “BAN THE BOX” IS A FAIR CHANCE FOR WORKERS WITH RECORDS 1
(2017), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
6. S. 1307, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018); S. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
7. S. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
8. See infra Part V(A) for a discussion about the failed Justice Reinvestment Initiative.
9. Betsy Z. Russell, Senate Panel Unanimously Backs Sen. Buckner-Webb’s ‘Ban the Box’ Bill, IDAHO
PRESS (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/senate-panel-unanimously-backs-senbuckner-webbs-ban-the-box-bill/article_7b930a7b-1442-50ec-bc80-ce5aea39fcdf.html; S. 1318, 65th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
10. S. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
11. AVERY & LU, supra note 1, at 2.
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It is no secret that ex-offenders struggle to find work upon release from
prison.12 Indeed, unemployability is one of many consequences that plague
prisoners long after they serve their sentences.13 Employers, for various reasons,
have grown increasingly reluctant to hire ex-offenders.14 Though not a federally
protected class, ex-offenders have challenged prospective employers’ rejection of
their application under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.15 Yet this legal pathway rarely
leads to victory.16 As a result, ex-offenders often find themselves unemployed and
back in prison.
A. The Consequences of a Criminal Record
Aside from jail time, fines, and perhaps community service, a criminal
conviction carries with it many “collateral consequences.” Collateral consequences
are the indirect legal and social penalties, disabilities, and disadvantages that flow
from a criminal conviction,17 including loss of voting rights, restricted access to
housing, social stigma, and, relevant here, limited employment prospects.18 Indeed,
ex-offenders face tremendous difficulty securing employment after serving their
sentences. A 2009 study found that job applicants with a criminal record are half as
likely to receive a “callback” as those without a record.19 Many employers are
reluctant to hire ex-offenders, blaming safety concerns and negligent hiring
liability.20 This reluctance has increased in the past several decades thanks to the
digitalization of criminal records.21 In the internet era, performing a background

12. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 937, 956 (2003).
13. See infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II(B).
16. See discussion infra Part II(B).
17. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 7 n.2 (3d ed. 2004).
18. Steven D. Bell, The Long Shadow: Decreasing Barriers to Employment, Housing, and Civic
Participation for People with Criminal Records Will Improve Public Safety and Strengthen the Economy,
42 W. ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014). The National Institute of the Justice’s Inventory of the Collateral
Consequences of Conviction (“NICCC”) compiles collateral consequences from each state. The NICCC’s
database reports that Idahoans with a criminal conviction suffer from a total of 678 collateral
consequences. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/consequences (select “Idaho” under
jurisdiction drop-down menu; then select “search”) (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
19. Pager et al., supra note 4, at 199.
20. Michael Connett, Comment, Employer Discrimination Against Individuals with a Criminal
Record: The Unfulfilled Role of State Fair Employment Agencies, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1015–17 (2011).
21. Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment
Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 902 (2014).
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check on a job applicant is increasingly convenient and inexpensive. 22 Despite
significant flaws associated with the for-profit background check system,23 a 2018
study revealed that approximately 73% of employers perform criminal background
checks on applicants.24 Upon learning of an applicant’s criminal history, over 60%
of employers in a second study admitted that they would “probably not” or
“definitely not” hire the applicant.25 The same study found that only 12.5%
“definitely would consider” hiring that same applicant.26 Naturally, this growing
trend has weakened employment prospects for ex-offenders, who constitute a
large share of today’s workforce.27 An estimated one-third of working-age
Americans today have a criminal record—whether it be an arrest or a conviction—
that will show up on a background check.28
This problem is exceptionally pronounced for people of color. Criminal records
more often plague Black and Hispanic Americans because “they are arrested at
rates greatly disproportionate to their share of the population and their level of
actual crime activity.”29 This disparity is well-documented.30 For example, Black
Americans accounted for 21% of the nation’s arrests in 2017, despite making up

22. Jonathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact and
Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 198 (2014).
23. Paul-Emile, supra note 21, at 907–09. “Exacerbating the situation are for-profit websites and
other background-check businesses that assemble publicly available arrest records, often including mug
shots and charges. Many sites charge fees to remove a record, even an outdated or erroneous one.”
Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a
Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-riseamericans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402.
24. SOC'Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. & CHARLES KOCH INST., WORKERS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 1, 2 (2018).
25. Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Ex-Offenders? Employer Checks, Background Checks,
and Their Determinants 8 (Berkeley Program on Hous. & Urban Pol’y, Working Paper No. W01-005,
2001), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3c6468h2.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. The Prison Policy Initiative estimates that the unemployment rate amongst working-age exoffenders is 27.3%, nearly five times the rate of their non-offender cohorts. LUCIUS COULOUTE & DANIEL
KOPF, OUT OF PRISON & OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG FORMERLY INCARCERATED PEOPLE (2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html.
28. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 23, at 1.
29. Paul-Emile, supra note 21, at 896.
30. Paul-Emile, supra note 21, at 911. A 2018 report submitted to the United Nations found that
“African Americans are more likely than white Americans to be arrested; once arrested, they are more
likely to be convicted; and once convicted, and [sic] they are more likely to experience lengthy prison
sentences. . . . As of 2001, one of every three Black boys born in that year could expect to go to prison
in his lifetime . . . .” THE SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE U.S.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racialdisparities/.
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only 13% of the general population.31 Contrary to empirical evidence demonstrating
comparable rates of drug use between white, Black, and Hispanic people, the latter
groups are more likely to be implicated in drug offenses than the former.32
Unsurprisingly, these racial inequities follow racial minorities in their job search
too.33 In the aforementioned 2009 study, the likelihood that an ex-offender
received a callback was lower for Black applicants than it was for white applicants.34
In fact, the study revealed that even white applicants with a criminal record were
more likely to receive a callback (17%) than Black applicants without a criminal
record (14%).35
Without reliable work, ex-offenders tend to reoffend. Indeed, research
suggests that unemployment is one of the strongest predictors of recidivism.36 To
recidivate is to return to criminal conduct.37 In other words, recidivism occurs when
a convicted criminal commits another crime after being released from a
correctional facility. Recidivism rates often guide policymakers’ decisions
concerning their criminal justice and reform systems.38 A high recidivism rate might
indicate that one or more prongs in a jurisdiction’s criminal justice system is
dysfunctional; a low recidivism rate might indicate the opposite.39
Today’s nationwide recidivism rates are discouraging. Recent data suggests
that roughly two-thirds of released prisoners will be arrested again within three

31. Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails are Misused to
Respond to Social Problems, PRISONER POLICY INITIATIVE (Aug. 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html.
32. Paul-Emile, supra note 21, at 911.
33. Pager, supra note 12, at 958.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Jennifer Hickes Lundquist et al., Does a Criminal Past Predict Worker Performance? Evidence
from One of America's Largest Employers, 96 SOC. FORCES 1039, 1041 (2018); Christopher Uggen, Work
as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism,
65 AM. SOCIO. REV. 529, 542 (2000).
37. Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 1000 (2019) (citing JOAN PETERSILIA,
RECIDIVISM, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 382, 382 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds.,
1996)).
38. Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures of Recidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 788 (2014)
(suggesting that some may view recidivism as “an existential test of the criminal justice system”).
39. Nora V. Demleitner, Judicial Challenges to the Collateral Impact of Criminal Convictions: Is True
Change in the Offing?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 164 (2016) (“Recidivism has become the hallmark of release
decisions and of judging the success of diversionary and treatment programs.”); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW
passim
(2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2016/recidivism_overview.pdf.
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years of release.40 Moreover, 85% of the prisoners who recidivate are unemployed
at the time they are re-arrested.41 Thus, unemployment and recidivism seem to go
hand in hand. For people of color, racial discrimination in both the criminal justice
system and the job market combine to create a vicious cycle:
Racial discrimination in the justice system makes people of color more
likely to have a criminal history, which makes them less likely to have
positive employment outcomes. Racial discrimination in the labor
market (with or without a criminal record) makes it less likely that a
person of color will have positive employment outcomes, potentially
increasing their likelihood of committing a crime.42
In sum, negative employment outcomes are one of many collateral
consequences tacked on to a criminal conviction. Employers are reluctant to hire
ex-offenders for various reasons, which prevents a substantial portion of America’s
workforce from entering the workforce. Inability to find work, amongst many other
extraneous factors, feeds the vicious cycle of offend, release, repeat. Racial
discrimination exacerbates each of these issues, leaving minorities particularly at
risk of recidivism. In response, some ex-offenders have turned to the courts to find
relief.
B. Title VII and Disparate Impact Liability
Traditionally, individuals experiencing discrimination in the employment
context have sought relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII was enacted
in 1964 as a means to remove obstacles that prevent certain classes from receiving
equal employment opportunities.43 Under Title VII, employers may not discriminate
against employees or job applicants on the basis of a person’s protected class. 44
Protected classes under Title VII include race, color, religion, national origin, and
sex.45
Convicted persons are not a protected class under Title VII.46 Still, ex-offenders
belonging to a protected class are not completely without recourse under Title VII.
40. Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of "Ban the Box":
Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes when Criminal Histories Are Hidden, 38 J. LAB. ECON.
321, 322 (2020).
41. Create a Culture of Employment Readiness and Retention for Incarcerated Individuals, NAT’L
INST. CORRECTIONS, https://info.nicic.gov/cirs/node/39 (last visited Mar. 31, 2022) [hereinafter NICIC].
42. CHRISTINA STACY & MYCHAL COHEN, BAN THE BOX AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF THE
EVIDENCE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 7–8 (2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88366/ban_the_box_and_racial_discrimination
.pdf.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018); Smith, supra note 22, at 202.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
45. Id.
46. See id.
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In the seminal case Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court recognized a new
avenue for claimants injured by discriminatory employment practices: disparate
impact liability.47 In Griggs, the Court announced that Title VII “proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.”48 This differs from a disparate treatment claim, which holds employers
liable for their facially discriminatory employment practices.49 Under a disparate
impact theory, a claimant may seek recourse where a facially neutral employment
practice—such as an employer’s rejection of an applicant—has a disparate impact
on a group protected by Title VII.50 Therefore, the claimant need not prove that the
employer had a discriminatory intent, unlike the disparate treatment theory.51 It
thus follows that an ex-offender belonging to a protected class could seek recourse
under Title VII if the employer’s facially neutral hiring decision disproportionately
impacted others belonging to that same class.
At first glance, the disparate impact claim appears promising. Given the
racially discriminatory practices observed in the justice system,52 the competing
discrimination against ex-offenders in hiring practices surely causes a disparate
impact on racial minorities in the job market. And with race being a protected class
under Title VII,53 one could conclude that the disparate impact claim could forge a
legal pathway for racial minorities who disproportionately carry criminal records.
For example, a person of color who was denied employment, presumably based on
his criminal record, could bring suit against the employer on a disparate impact
theory under the premise that the employer’s facially neutral hiring decision
disproportionately impacted racial minorities. Yet, evidentiary burdens and
growing reluctance towards disparate impact claims largely foreclose this avenue.54
Courts employ a three-part burden-shifting standard in disparate impact
claims.55 Plaintiffs must first prove that the employer’s facially-neutral policy—or
here, hiring decision—has an adverse impact on a protected class.56 The burden
then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that its hiring decision is “consistent

47. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
50. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018).
51. Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 558 (2018).
52. Bornstein, supra note 51 passim.
53. Bornstein, supra note 51, at 523.
54. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 738–39
(2006).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018). Each time the burden shifts, the party must overcome their
burden by a preponderance of the evidence standard. Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn,
Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 391
(1996).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
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with business necessity.”57 If satisfied, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who
may then only prevail by proving that less discriminatory alternatives exist.58
Plaintiffs frequently fail in the first phase of their disparate impact claims.59 In
the first phase, disparate impact claimants must provide sufficient evidence
demonstrating that the employer’s hiring practice disproportionately harms her
protected class.60 In practice, this evidentiary burden has proved troublesome. 61
Claimants typically introduce general population statistics or relevant labor market
statistics to demonstrate that the challenged action exerts a disproportionate
impact on a protected class.62 For example, the plaintiffs in Griggs introduced
general population data showing significantly lower high school graduation rates
for Black students than white students.63 The Court accepted this evidence as
sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant’s requirement of a high school
diploma for a low-skilled labor position disproportionately impacted Black
applicants.64 However, courts have increasingly deemed such statistical evidence
insufficient to support the link between an employer’s hiring decision and its effects
on a protected class.65 In dismissing a claim that relied on disproportionate
incarceration rates between Black and white Americans, the Second Circuit recently
remarked, “[f]acts are stubborn things, but statistics are pliable.”66 This sentiment
captures the growing scrutiny towards plaintiffs’ use of statistical evidence in the
first phase of a disparate impact action.67 Apart from evidentiary scrutiny, some
courts have demonstrated outright hostility towards ex-offenders’ use of the
disparate impact theory in court. Perhaps the most recognizable instance of this
hostility is found in a 1989 opinion, where a federal Florida judge remarked, “[i]f
Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because they have been
convicted of theft then they should stop stealing.”68
The business necessity defense sounds the death knell for many disparate
impact claims. If a claimant satisfies her initial burden, the burden then shifts to the
employer.69 Employers may then raise the business necessity defense, under which
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2018).
59. See Smith, supra note 22, at 207.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
61. Smith, supra note 22, at 205; Connett, supra note 20, at 1026.
62. Connett, supra note 20, at 1019–27 (discussing methods by which disparate impact claimants
have attempted to satisfy burden in first phase).
63. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 n.6 (1971).
64. Id. To be clear, the defendant’s graduation requirement ran afoul of Title VII because of its
disparate impact on Black applicants and because the requirement lacked a “demonstrable relationship
to successful performance of the jobs . . . .” Id. at 430–32.
65. Smith, supra note 22, at 205. The historical treatment of disparate impact claims falls outside
the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive analysis, see Connett, supra note 20.
66. Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2020).
67. Connett, supra note 20, at 1030–31; Smith, supra note 22, at 206–07.
68. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
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the employer must prove that its action–here, its hiring decision–was “consistent
with business necessity.”70 Title VII advises that the employer’s rejection of the
applicant is consistent with business necessity if the reason for rejection is related
to the job in question (e.g., the applicant’s armed robbery conviction poses a risk
of theft if hired as a bank teller).71 In the absence of further instruction from Title
VII, courts have accorded different levels of deference to the employer’s action or
policy under this defense.72 For example, the Third Circuit determined that criminal
background screening may be consistent with business necessity if the screening
would accurately “distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level
of risk and those that do not.”73 By contrast, employers challenged in the Eighth
Circuit receive much less deference. In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, the Eighth
Circuit articulated the following factors “by which an employer may justify its use
of criminal background screenings: (1) the nature of the underlying crime, (2) the
time elapsed since conviction, (3) and the nature of the position sought.” 74 Under
the Green factors, employers could lawfully reject very few job applicants based on
their criminal background. Yet the Green factors have not gained traction in other
circuits.75 Increasingly, courts have embraced standards akin to the Third Circuit’s
employer-deferential standard.76 As a result, disparate impact claimants face not
one, but two Goliaths once the burden shifts to the employer: the business
necessity defense and the court’s deferential treatment of the same.77
Disparate impact claimants today find themselves significantly disadvantaged
at every turn. Evidentiary burdens and employer-favoring courts have thus
foreclosed Title VII as an adequate vehicle for recourse in many contexts.78 As for
ex-offenders, these tendencies signal that Title VII’s protection has little practical
effect on the discriminatory hiring practices observed by ex-offenders in their job
search.
III. A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: BAN THE BOX LAWS

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Rebecca Wolfe, The Safest Port in the Storm: The Case for a Ban the Box Law in South Carolina,
9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 503, 510 (2015); El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (“SEPTA”), 479 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir.
2007).
73. El, 479 F.3d at 245.
74. Wolfe, supra note 72, at 510; 523 F.2d 1290, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975). In 2012, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission codified the Green factors in its guidelines on employers’ use of
criminal background checks on job applicants. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 915.002,
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012).
75. Smith, supra note 22, at 208.
76. Id.
77. Connett, supra note 20, at 1028.
78. Selmi, supra note 54, at 738–39.
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A growing majority of U.S. states–thirty-six as of December 2020–have
enacted ban the box legislation.79 Twenty-three of these states joined the
movement within the last five years.80 All ban the box laws at the federal, state, and
local level are uniform in purpose: eliminate barriers preventing ex-offenders from
finding gainful employment. However, the means by which existing ban the box
laws seek to achieve this objective vary greatly.
A. Varying Degrees of Protection: A Nationwide Overview of Fair Chance Laws
Over three-fourths of the American population today lives in a jurisdiction
that has enacted a ban the box law.81 Yet the protections enjoyed by this sweeping
majority are not uniform. First, most states that have enacted ban the box laws only
extend those policies to public employers–not private employers.82 Moreover,
states that do subject private employers to ban the box policies exclude certain
employers from scrutiny based on their size. For example, California’s ban the box
law only applies to private employers employing five or more people.83 By contrast,
Illinois’ ban the box law only applies to private employers with fifteen or more
employees.84 All private employers in Colorado–regardless of size–must comply
with the state’s ban the box law.85 As such, employer coverage fluctuates from state
to state.
Ban the box laws also vary significantly in terms of timing: some states prohibit
employers’ inquiry into an applicant’s criminal record until a conditional offer is
made,86 whereas others merely prohibit inquiry on the initial job application itself.87
Between these two extremes, more variables exist. Some states delay inquiry until
after a first interview,88 after all interviews conclude,89 or after the applicant

79. Avery & Lu, supra note 1, at 2.
80. Avery & Lu, supra note 1, at 2 (Arizona (2017), Georgia (2015), Indiana (2017), Kansas (2018),
Kentucky (2017), Louisiana (2016), Maine (2019), Michigan (2018), Missouri (2016), Nevada (2017), New
Hampshire (2020), New York (2015), North Dakota (2019), Ohio (2015), Oklahoma (2016), Oregon
(2015), Pennsylvania (2017), Tennessee (2016), Utah (2017), Vermont (2016, 2015), Virginia (2020,
2015), Washington (2018), and Wisconsin (2016)).
81. Avery & Lu, supra note 1, at 3.
82. Id. Only fourteen of the thirty-six states that have enacted ban the box legislation cover both
public and private employers: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
Id.
83. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952(a) (West 2019).
84. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/10 (2015).
85. 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1103-9-2 (2019); see also Avery & Lu, supra note 1, at 11.
86. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(b) (West 2020).
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51(i)(b) (West 2017).
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g)(1) (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:1701(A) (2016); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-203(c) (LexisNexis 2018).
89. Prince William County, Va., Res. No. 15-672 (Oct. 13, 2015).
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becomes a finalist.90 The earlier employers learn of an applicant’s criminal history,
the less likely the employer will engage in an independent assessment of the
applicant’s qualification.91 Therefore, ex-offenders derive more protection from
ban the box policies that postpone inquiry until the final stages of the hiring
process.
Other states and municipalities protect ex-offenders from disparate
treatment by demanding transparency in hiring decisions. For example, an
ordinance in Prince George’s County, Maryland, requires employers to notify
jobseekers when their applications are rejected based on their criminal record. 92
The employer must promptly notify the applicant of its employment decision,
provide the applicant with a copy of her criminal record report, and specify the
information on which it based its decision.93 Perhaps the strongest source of
protection in fair chance laws is the applicant’s ability to challenge a rejection. Some
fair chance laws create formal or informal appeals processes by which an applicant
can challenge a rejection.94 For example, once a Californian employer has provided
an applicant notice of intent to rescind an offer based on the applicant’s criminal
record, the applicant is given time to respond with evidence of inaccuracies in the
criminal record, her rehabilitation, or mitigating circumstances. 95 Similarly, in
Minnesota, employers cannot disqualify an applicant if she can provide “competent
evidence of sufficient rehabilitation.”96 Sufficient rehabilitation can be
demonstrated by proof that the applicant has been released from confinement for
at least one year, that she has complied with parole or probation conditions, or that
she has not been convicted of any crimes since her release.97
Each of these variables fall somewhere on a spectrum of protection. Publicprivate employer coverage, delayed inquiry, notification requirements, and appeals
processes all play a role in creating this spectrum. The most aggressive fair chance
laws legislate these variables at their highest degree of protection. Hawaii’s ban on
the box law is illustrative.98
In 1998, Hawaii became the first state to adopt a fair chance law. 99 Under
Hawaii’s ban the box law, public and private employers are prohibited from
inquiring into an applicant’s criminal history until after the employer has made a

90. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101(3)(b) (West 2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3(A) (West 2021).
91. See infra note 123.
92. Prince George’s County, Md., CODE OF ORDINANCES Subtit. 2, div. 12, Subdiv. 10, § 2-231.05(b)
(2015).
93. Id. New Mexico’s fair chance law also requires written notification of rejection if based in
whole or in part on the applicant’s criminal record. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-4(B) (West 2021).
94. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952 (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West 2013).
95. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952(c)(2)–(5) (West 2019).
96. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03(3)(a) (West 2013).
97. Id. § 364.03(3)(a)(1)–(3).
98. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 2020).
99. Id.
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conditional offer.100 Even then, the employer’s hands are somewhat tied: the offer
may only be withdrawn if the conviction bears a “rational relationship” to the duties
and responsibilities associated with the offered position.101 Furthermore, Hawaiian
employers are restricted in the type of convictions they may consider.102 Employers
cannot consider felony convictions that occurred more than seven years ago, nor
misdemeanor convictions that occurred more than five years ago. 103 Finally,
individuals may challenge hiring decisions that run afoul of Hawaii’s ban the box law
in court.104 If successful, courts may grant such aggrieved individuals backpay from
the employer or other equitable relief, such as employment by the defendant.105
The spectrum of fair chance laws is expanding rapidly. As more states enact
ban the box laws, this spectrum evolves to create more dimensions of protection
for ex-offenders. And if Hawaii occupies one end of the spectrum, signifying
aggressive protection of a job applicant’s criminal history, Idaho occupies the other:
ex-offenders in Idaho receive no such protection under state law.
B. Idaho’s Failed Fair Chance Bills: A Discussion of Senate Bills 1307 & 1318
Considering the wide range of protection conferred by other jurisdictions’ ban
the box laws, it is worthwhile to compare them against the fair chance bills
previously introduced to the Idaho Legislature. The Idaho Legislature has twice
considered ban the box bills: once in 2018, and again in 2020.106 Despite
tremendous efforts to legislate these bills, neither bill survived Idaho’s legislative
session.
Idaho Senator Cherie Buckner-Webb (D-19) sponsored the first fair chance bill
in 2018.107 Compared to the range of ban the box variables discussed in Part III(A),
Senate Bill 1307 (“Bill 1307”) contained highly protective measures akin to Hawaii’s
ban the box law.108 Bill 1307 prohibited employers from conducting criminal

100. Id.
101. Id. § 378-2.5(b). Other fair chance laws employ similar requirements whereupon employers
may rescind an offer or otherwise reject an application. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952(c)(1)(A) (West 2013) (if
“direct and adverse relationship with the specific duties of the job” exists); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5101(4)(b) (West 2021) (if there is a “direct relationship” between conviction and job); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
364.03(1) (West 2013) (if conviction “directly relates” to position); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 284.281,
284.283 (West 2018) (if conviction “directly relates” to job responsibilities); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9125 (West 1982) (limited to the “extent to which they relate to the applicant’s suitability” for
the job); VA. EXEC. ORDER NO. 41 (2015) (if conviction is “demonstrably job-related”).
102. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(c) (West 2020).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 378-4 (West 1989).
105. Id. § 378-5(a)–(b).
106. See S. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020); S. 1307, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2018).
107. See S. 1307, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018).
108. See id.
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background checks on job applicants until a conditional offer had been made. 109
Even then, employers could not reject an applicant based on her criminal record
without performing an assessment under which three factors—the Green factors—
must be considered: “(i) the nature and gravity of the offense and conduct; (ii) the
time that has passed since the offense or conduct and the completion of the
sentence; and (iii) the nature of the job held or sought and its relevance to the
conviction.”110 Further, if an employer were to reject an applicant based on her
record, the employer was bound under Bill 1307 to provide the applicant with
notice and reasoning for its rejection.111 On February 12, 2018, Bill 1307 was
introduced in the Senate.112 The bill died on its second day in committee.113
The 2020 bill fared much better. Following the 2018 legislative session,
Senator Buckner-Webb worked closely with the American Civil Liberties Union to
revise Bill 1307 for proposal in 2020.114 Senate Bill 1318, the 2020 bill, embodied a
less aggressive approach to fair chance policies compared to Bill 1307. As proposed,
Senate Bill 1318 (“Bill 1318”) would have amended Title 44 of the Idaho Code by
adding a new chapter 28.115 The purpose of Bill 1318 was threefold: “(1) Encourage
the full participation of motivated and qualified persons with criminal histories in
our state’s workforce; (2) Reduce recidivism; and (3) Assure public safety through
furthering economic participation.”116
As first proposed, Bill 1318 reflected a moderately aggressive approach to
ensure fair chance employment. First, both public and private employers were
subjected to fair chance policies under Bill 1318.117 Second, Bill 1318 prohibited
employers from asking for criminal history until the applicant had been notified that
she had been selected for an interview. 118 In the alternative, if no interview is
required, employers could not inquire into the applicant’s criminal history until a
conditional job offer was made.119 However, beyond that, the bill contained no
further restrictions: employers could base their rejection in whole or in part on the
applicant’s criminal history, and the employer was not required to provide formal
notification if the applicant was rejected based on her record.120 Furthermore, Bill

109. Id.
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See S. 1307, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018).
114. Sen. Buckner-Webb’s Fair Chance Employment Bill Printed, KBOI-AM (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.kboi.com/2020/02/10/sen-buckner-webbs-fair-chance-employment-bill-printed/.
115. S. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See S. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
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1318 exempted law enforcement agencies, criminal justice system employers, and
employers seeking unpaid volunteers.121
Bill 1318 passed the Senate 21-13-1.122 Thereafter, legislators in the House
Judiciary, Rules & Administration Committee expressed reservations about the
burden Bill 1318 would impose on small business owners. 123 Two amendments
were proposed.124 The first amendment sought to exclude 501(c)(3) corporations
and any employer seeking to fill a position dedicated to the keeping or storage of a
safe.125 The second proposed amendment, amongst other things, preempted other
nondiscrimination laws, regulations, and ordinances.126 Co-sponsors of the bill
opposed the preemptive nature of the second amendment as threatening
otherwise sound anti-discrimination law.127 Illustratively, Representative Ilana
Rubel (D-18) dubbed the amendment a “poison pill” that would “basically make [Bill
1318] worse than nothing.”128
After the amendments were offered, Bill 1318 failed to garner a final vote on
the floor.129 Idaho’s 2020 legislative session thus concluded without enactment of
a ban the box bill.
IV. BAN THE BOX LAWS AS A SOLUTION FOR RECIDIVISM
An estimated eighty-five percent of prisoners who reoffend are unemployed
at the time of their rearrest.130 As illustrated in Part III(A), many state and local
jurisdictions have adopted ban the box laws for the purpose of reducing this figure.
States that have yet to take this leap, including Idaho, may harbor reservations
about this movement. Common questions amongst lawmakers and constituents
alike are whether employment should be made more accessible to criminals and
whether fair chance laws actually achieve their objective in increasing employment
rates amongst ex-offenders.
121. Id.
122. S. Judiciary & Rules Comm., Bill Status of S.B. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020)
https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2020/legislation/S1318/.
123. H. Judiciary, Rule & Admin. Comm. Minutes, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 4 (Idaho 2020).
124. H.R. Amend. to S.B. No. 1318: Amend. to Sec. 1, 65th Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2020/legislation/S1318A1.pdf; H.R.
Amend. to S.B. No. 1318: Amend. to the Bill, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2020/legislation/S1318A3.pdf.
125. H.R. Amend. to S.B. No. 1318: Amend. to Sec. 1, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2020/legislation/S1318A1.pdf.
126. H.R. Amend. to S.B. No. 1318: Amend. to the Bill, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., (Idaho 2020),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2020/legislation/S1318A3.pdf.
127. Video of Idaho Legislative Session 2020 Day 73, House Chambers, at 02:58:00 (Mar. 18,
2020), https://insession.idaho.gov/IIS/2020/House/Chambers/HouseChambers03-18-2020.mp4.
128. Id. at 02:59:00.
129. See S. Judiciary & Rules Comm., Bill Status of S.B. 1318, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2020) https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2020/legislation/S1318/.
130. NICIC, supra note 41.
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A. Rationale for Ban the Box Laws
At its core, the ban the box movement seeks to remove the barriers that
prevent ex-offenders’ reentry into society. As explained in Part II(A), unemployment
is one of many lasting consequences of a criminal conviction. Further, employment
status strongly predicts whether an ex-offender will reoffend.131 The idea behind
banning the box is that employers can glean a more accurate representation of an
applicant’s qualification for a position before learning of his criminal record.
At a minimum, banning the box prevents employers from categorically
rejecting all applications with a checkmark under criminal history. More profoundly,
momentum behind fair chance laws is partially based on “their potential to address
racial disparities in the justice system and labor market.”132 Some commentators
have gone so far as to suggest that employing criminals actually improves public
safety.133 Under this theory, commentators reason that stable employment reduces
the likelihood that individuals will reoffend, which in turn lowers crime rates and
increases public safety.134
But the question must be asked: Should employers hire ex-offenders? Is it safe
to place trust in individuals who have made frequent contact with the criminal
justice system? A common theme behind blanket rejections is safety: employers
worry that hiring an ex-offender may risk the safety of their employees, clients, and
valuables in the workplace.135 However, this fear is largely unfounded. Research
indicates that ex-offenders make for reliable and competent employees.136 One
study following ex-offenders in post-release employment found that 80% of the
employed participants reported that their employers knew of their criminal history,
but nonetheless were satisfied with their work.137 Another study performed on
military enlistees with criminal records observed consistent performance levels
between ex-offender enlistees and non-offender enlistees.138 Perhaps more
surprising was the researchers’ second discovery: enlistees with felony-level
convictions were promoted more quickly and to higher ranks than non-offender
enlistees.139

131. See Dallan F. Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1082 n.10
(2019) (listing studies that conclude unemployment is strongly linked with recidivism).
132. Stacy & Cohen, supra note 42, at 10.
133. Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65 Million "Need Not Apply": The Case
for Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (2011),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Holzer et al., supra note 25, at 1.
136. See Christy Visher et al., Employment after Prison: A Longitudinal Study of Releasees in Three
States, WASHINGTON, D.C.: URB. INST. (2008).
137. Id.
138. Lundquist, et al., supra note 36, at 1050.
139. Lundquist, et al., supra note 36, at 1052.
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Employers also harbor concerns about fair chance laws’ administrative
burden. By delaying inspection of an applicant’s criminal history until an interview,
some employers fear that ban the box laws waste valuable time and administrative
expense if they discover a conflict with the applicant’s criminal history.140 A
Minnesota study discounts this fear.141 There, the study surveyed human resource
professionals and found that ban the box had little to no effect on applicant
screening time or hiring costs.142
B. Do Fair Chance Laws Work?
Given its recent surge in popularity, many ban the box laws are relatively
new—and, as a result, largely untested. Increasingly in the past five years,
researchers have begun to assess the efficacy of fair chance laws.143
At the very least, fair chance laws have provided positive results in one
important stage of the hiring process: callbacks. Studies have invariably concluded
that fair chance laws have increased callback rates for ex-offenders.144 A “callback”
generally denotes an employer’s request for an interview, information, or further
contact in response to a job application.145 The “callback stage” is particularly
important in measuring ban the box efficacy because it is susceptible to

140. For instance, if the applicant’s criminal record presents a risk to the position sought, thereby
giving rise to a business necessity defense.
141. Laura S. Bogardus, Impact of Ban the Box on Hiring Processes, HEALTH EDUC. HUM. DEV. AWARDS
(2015), https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/hehd_awards/10/.
142. Id.
143. For studies concluding overall positive impacts, see Stewart J. D'Alessio et al., The Effect of
Hawaii's Ban the Box Law on Repeat Offending, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 336 (2015); COLENN BERRACASA ET
AL., THE IMPACT OF “BAN THE BOX” IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2016), https://www.congress.gov/116
/meeting/house/109189/documents/HMKP-116-GO00-20190326-SD011.pdf; Terry-Ann L. Craigie, Ban
the Box, Convictions, and Public Employment (Sept. 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906893; Daniel Shoag & Stan Veuger, No Woman No
Crime: Ban the Box, Employment, and Upskilling (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 16-015,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795; Flake, supra note 131. For
studies concluding overall negative impacts, see Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal
Records, and Racial Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191 (2017), https://doi.org
/10.1093/qje/qjx028; Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does "Ban the Box" Help or Hurt LowSkilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are
Hidden (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22469, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w22469.pdf; Osborne Jackson & Bo Zhao, The Effect of Changing Employers' Access to Criminal
Histories on Ex-Offenders' Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the 2010-2012 Massachusetts CORI
Reform (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 16-30, 2017), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media
/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/wp1630.pdf.
144. Agan & Starr supra note 143, at 16; Flake, supra note 131, at 1106.
145 See, e.g., Agan & Starr supra note 143, at 15; Flake, supra note 131, at 1103.
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discrimination.146 As described in Part II(A), a criminal record decreases the
likelihood of receiving a callback by 50%.147 In response to these discouraging
figures, a field experiment was conducted in 2019 to assess whether ban the box
laws improved these callback rates.148 The experiment compared callback rates for
ex-offender-applicants between two cities: one with ban the box legislation
(Chicago) and one without it (Dallas).149 The researcher located entry-level foodservice job listings, a common target for ex-offenders, and submitted nearly
identical application materials for fictitious candidates supposedly belonging to
three different races: Black, Latino, and white.150 His results were promising.
Applicants in the ban-the-box city, Chicago, were 27% more likely to receive a
callback than in Dallas, where applicants were required to disclose their criminal
record on initial applications.151 Further, all three participating races had higher
callback rates in Chicago, particularly for Black applicants: Black applicants in the
Chicago study received 7.1% more callbacks than their counterparts in the Dallas
study.152
Yet the ultimate goal of ban the box is to employ more ex-offenders, not just
ensure they receive an initial callback. Specific case studies have shown increased
employment rates in ex-offenders since passing ban the box legislation. In
Washington, D.C., for example, the number of ex-offender hires increased by 33%
after the District’s ban the box law took effect.153 In Durham County, North Carolina,
the increase in employment rates was sevenfold.154 Another study observed as
much as a 14% increase in employment rates amongst residents of high-crime areas
after enacting ban the box.155 At least one ban the box jurisdiction has measured
the efficacy of ban the box laws by tracking recidivism rates. 156 According to
Hawaii’s statewide recidivism rate, Hawaii’s aggressive take on ban the box

146. Stacy & Cohen, supra note 42, at 11; see Marc Bendick, Lauren E. Brown & Kennington Wall,
No Foot in the Door: An Experimental Study of Employment Discrimination, 10(4) J. AGING SOC. POL. 5
(1999).
147. Pager et al., supra note 4, at 199.
148. See Flake, supra note 131, at 1086–87.
149. Flake, supra note 131,at 1096–97.
150. Flake, supra note 131, at 1099–1101.
151. Flake, supra note 131, at 1107.
152. Flake, supra note 131, at 1106.
153. BERRACASA ET AL., supra note 143, at 16.
154. Daryl V. Atkinson & Kathleen Lockwood, The Benefits of Ban the Box: A Case Study of
Durham, N.C., S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUST. (2014),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190326/109189/HMKP-116-GO00-20190326SD013.pdf.
155. SHOAG & VEUGER, supra note 143, at 18.
156. D’Alessio et al., supra note 143, at 343, 347.

306

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

performed well.157 A 2014 study concluded that recidivism rates dropped by 57%
since Hawaii enacted its ban the box law in 1998. 158
While the thrust of ban the box is to increase ex-offenders’ employment rates,
some ban the box jurisdictions have observed economic fortune attendant to rising
employment rates.159 Prison operation expenditures place a grave economic impact
on states with high incarceration rates.160 Indeed, Idaho’s expenditures on
corrections totaled $330 million in 2019.161 A Philadelphia study concluded that
hiring just 100 ex-offenders could increase income tax contributions in Philadelphia
by $1.9 million, increase sales tax revenue by $770,000, and save the city $2 million
each year in criminal justice costs.162
However, two studies posit that fair chance laws harm, not help, employment
prospects for Black and Hispanic ex-offenders.163 These studies have spawned a
“small but growing chorus of critics” who seek to repeal ban the box laws.164 The
first study, performed in New York City and New Jersey, observed an overall
increase in callbacks made to ex-offenders but a larger disparity between callbacks
made to white and Black applicants.165 Researchers in the second study concluded
that banning the box disadvantages young, low-skilled Black and Hispanic men,
reducing employment outcomes by 5.1% and 2.9% respectively.166 Both studies
suggest that ban the box laws uncover employers’ implicit bias.167 Specifically, the
studies posit that employers in ban the box jurisdictions are more inclined to
blanket reject all applicants whose other qualities on the application—be it their
name or zip code—indicate that they are Black or Hispanic.168 Employers assume,
the researchers suggest, that all Black and Hispanic individuals have a criminal
record purely based on their race, and thus reject applicants they perceive as Black
or Hispanic since the employer cannot verify whether their record is clean under
the ban the box law.169

157. D’Alessio et al., supra note 143, at 343, 347.
158. D’Alessio et al., supra note 143, at 347.
159. Atkinson & Lockwood, supra note 154.
160. Aaron F. Nadich, Comment, Ban the Box: An Employer's Medicine Masked as a Headache, 19
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 767, 773 (2014).
161. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2020 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 62 tbl.35 (2020).
162. Economic Benefits of Employing Formerly Incarcerated Individuals in Philadelphia, ECON.
LEAGUE OF GREATER PHILA. (Sept. 2011), https://economyleague.org/uploads/files/7211704136107834economic-benefits-of-employing-formerly-incarcerated-executive-summary.pdf.
163. Agan & Starr, supra note 143; Doleac & Hansen, supra note 143.
164. Flake, supra note 128, at 1085.
165. Agan & Starr, supra note 143, at 3.
166. Doleac & Hansen, supra note 143, at 17.
167. Agan & Starr, supra note 143, at 37; Doleac & Hansen, supra note 143, at 4, 17.
168. Agan & Starr, supra note 143, at 37; see Doleac & Hansen, supra note 143, at 4, 17.
169. See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 143, at 17.
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These studies have received heavy criticism.170 One concern is that the
geographic scope of one of these studies captured statistics from areas not subject
to any ban the box laws.171 Others argue that certain policies or characteristics
specific to the test cities temper the effect of their ban the box laws, and thus their
results do not bear on how other metropolitan areas will respond to ban the box
legislation.172 Regardless of their accuracy, however, these critical studies bring to
light a more sinister truth that ban the box legislation cannot cure. It is unclear
whether employers in these studies consciously or subconsciously rejected minority
applicants. In any event, ridding the nation of its deeply rooted implicit bias falls
outside of ban the box legislation’s ambit. As such, the results of these two studies
should not be overstated.
A majority of U.S. states today have enacted ban the box legislation. 173
Lawmakers who now remain in the minority may question whether these laws pose
safety risks to their community or whether they actually “work.” The few
comprehensive studies that have undertaken the latter question have arguably
produced more debate than results. Although more research is needed to fully
understand the effects of ban the box legislation, the results of the existing studies
resoundingly reveal that ban the box laws do indeed improve employment
prospects for ex-offenders.
V. IDAHO EX-OFFENDERS NEED A FAIR CHANCE
A. Idaho’s Mass Incarceration Problem
In 2019, the nation’s imprisonment rate fell for the eleventh consecutive year,
hitting its lowest point since 1995.174 Idaho hit its own milestone that year in
imprisonment rates, a feat that passed without celebration: in 2019, Idaho’s
incarceration rate increased for its fourth consecutive year.175

170. Stacy & Cohen, supra note 42, at 13–14 (summarizing criticisms of the Agan & Starr and
Doleac & Hansen studies).
171. Stacy & Cohen, supra note 42, at 14.
172. Stacy & Cohen, supra note 42, at 13–14.
173. See AVERY & LU, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
174. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2019 1 (2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf [hereinafter CARSON 2019].
175. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2016 4 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf; JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
PRISONERS IN 2017 4 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [hereinafter Bronson &
Carson 2017]; E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2018 4 (2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf; CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 4 (showing an 8.9%
increase in Idaho prison population between 2018 and 2019).
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Idaho is no stranger to the nationwide mass incarceration crisis.176 Despite
having one of the lowest crime rates in the country, Idaho’s imprisonment rate is
tremendously high. Between 1980 and 2017, Idaho’s prison population grew by
849%.177 And Idaho’s growing popularity178 is not to blame; according to the Idaho
Office of Performance Evaluations, Idaho’s rising incarceration rates “dramatically
outpace[ ] the state’s population growth.”179 What’s to blame, then?
Largely, recidivism. A substantial majority of Idaho prisoners are
reincarcerated after unsuccessful reentry into society.180 Many Idaho prison returns
are borne out of community supervision violations.181 Such violations occur when
the releasee either commits a new crime while on parole or probation, or when the
releasee violates a technical term of her supervision.182 Overworked and
understaffed parole and probation offices are, naturally, slow to respond to parole
and probation violations.183 Without a well-oiled supervisory system in place,
violators are sent back to prison to await assessment from their parole or probation
officers. These returnees make up 62% of Idaho’s prison population today.184

176. See Shannon Moudy, Recidivism and the Revolving Door of the Idaho Judicial System, KLEWTV
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://klewtv.com/news/local/recidivism-and-the-revolving-door-of-the-idaho-judicialsystem; Marty Trillhaase, Idaho, the Prison State, May Reform its Ways, LEWISTON TRIB. (Nov. 10, 2013),
https://media.spokesman.com/documents/2013/11/3133_001.pdf.
177. BLUEPRINT FOR SMART JUSTICE: IDAHO, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 7 (2019),
https://www.acluidaho.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/sj-blueprint-id.pdf
[hereinafter
BLUEPRINT FOR IDAHO].
178. Samantha Sharf, Full List: America’s Fastest-Growing Cities 2018, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:53
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2018/02/28/full-list-americas-fastest-growingcities-2018/?sh=607fd4ee7feb. Idaho’s capital, Boise, was named the fastest-growing city in the country
in 2018. Id. Boise, Idaho was ranked the best place to live in 2019 and the best place in the country to
buy a home. Winona Dimeo-Ediger, 2019 Top 100 Best Places to Live, LIVABILITY.COM,
https://livability.com/best-places/top-100-best-places-to-live/2019; Adam McCann, Best Real-Estate
Markets, WALLETHUB (Aug. 24, 2020), https://wallethub.com/edu/best-real-estate-markets/14889..
179. Rebecca Boone, Report: Idaho Could Save Money by Building a State Prison, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/3c9ce7281d834c9cf5d98081bec50d03. Lance
McCleve of Idaho’s Office of Performance Evaluations explained to members of the state legislature’s
Joint Legislative Oversight Committee that Idaho’s general population had increased six percent
between 2016 and 2020, whereas its prison population grew approximately eighteen percent in the
same time period. Id.
180. CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 13. Post-release community supervision violations
accounted for 62% of Idaho’s prison admissions in 2019, compared to the nationwide 29%. CARSON 2019,
supra note 174, at 13.
181 CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 13.
182. CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 13–14 tbl.8, n.c.
183 Idaho’s Justice Reinvestment Approach, COUNCIL STATE GOV’T. JUST. CTR. 2 (Sept. 2014),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Idaho-JR-Approach.pdf [hereinafter CSG
JUSTICE CENTER].
184. CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 13.
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Idaho lawmakers finally acknowledged the state’s recidivism problem in 2014.
In collaboration with The Council of State Governments (“CSG”), lawmakers
promised to renovate the state’s justice system.185 The CSG conducted a review of
Idaho’s justice system and concluded that Idaho’s existing system was not reducing
recidivism.186 Its research indicated that resources previously funding communitybased programs for ex-offenders had been reallocated to prison-based treatment,
which left newly released prisoners with little guidance after release.187 Idaho
lawmakers were eager to respond. In spring of 2014, the Idaho Legislature passed
the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (“JRI”).188 The purpose of the JRI was to “reduce
correctional spending and reinvest any potential cost avoidance/savings into
strategies designed to reduce recidivism.” 189 Policymakers set forth three
objectives through which Idaho expected to achieve a 15% decrease in recidivism:
(1) strengthen supervision practices and programs, (2) tailor sanctions and parole
decision making, and (3) assess and track recidivism-reduction strategies.190
The justice reinvestment plan, however, was a statistical failure. At the time
that CSG conducted its review in 2014, Idaho prisons were projected to reach 9,408
population—a 16% increase—by 2019 if the legislature did not enact the JRI.191
Strikingly, Idaho’s prison population reached 9,437 by December 2019 even after
enacting the JRI in 2014.192 Save an initial decline in incarceration rates postenactment, Idaho’s imprisonment rate has grown each year since the JRI has gone
into effect.193 Prison facilities surged from 100% capacity in 2017 to 110% capacity
in 2019.194 Minority imprisonment rates have also climbed: despite constituting less
than one percent of Idaho’s general population in 2019, Black Idahoans made up
three percent of Idaho’s prison population.195 In addition, the Black inmate
185. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, at 2.
186. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, at 2.
187. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, at 2.
188. S. 1357, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014).
189. IDAHO DEP’T OF CORR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IMPACT IN IDAHO: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (Feb. 1,
2019), https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/document/2019_jri_impact_report_final [hereinafter “JRI
IMPACT IN IDAHO”].
190. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, at 2–3. Increasing employment opportunities was not a
focal point of the bill. Instead, the bill’s strategy to reduce recidivism focused in part on developing the
role of parole and probation officers. “The state increased training and funding for case officers, created
a Limited Supervision Unit for people who were deemed likely to succeed with less supervision, and
required reviews every 6 months to determine if someone should receive an early discharge.” BLUEPRINT
FOR IDAHO, supra note 177, at 12.
191. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, at 3.
192. CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 4.
193. BLUEPRINT FOR IDAHO, supra note 177, at 5.
194. BRONSON & CARSON 2017, supra note 175, at 25; CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 24.
195. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SC–EST2019–SR11H–16, POPULATION DIVISION, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE
RESIDENT POPULATION BY SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN FOR IDAHO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2019 (2020)
[hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU Report]; CARSON 2019, supra note 174, at 36.
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population increased by 13.77% between 2018 and 2019.196 White Idahoans, on the
other hand, were underrepresented in Idaho prison populations: whereas 93% of
Idaho’s general population in 2019 was white, only 74% of its prisoners were
white.197 Finally, the failure of the JRI affected those outside of prison’s walls:
taxpayers. In 2019, Idaho spent $283 million of its general funding on corrections,
the same amount the state spent in elementary and secondary education that
year.198 Accordingly, the JRI has come under much scrutiny by lawmakers and law
enforcers.199 While some defend the failure for lack of funding and
implementation,200 others call for a complete repeal of the legislation.201 One
certainty remains: Idaho’s mass incarceration problem is persistent and in
desperate need of attention.
B. Current Protective Measures in Place for Idaho Ex-Offenders
Ninety-five percent of Idahoans serving prison sentences will eventually
reenter society.202 Those who are afforded a second chance may attempt to
establish stability through meaningful employment. 203 With this in mind, exoffenders reentering society may wonder what, if any, protective measures Idaho
law affords ex-offenders during their job search.

196.
IDAHO
DEP’T
OF
CORR.,
POPULATION
REPORT
FY
2019,
33
(2019),
https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/document/fy_2019_population_full_report [hereinafter IDOC
REPORT].
197. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, supra note 195; IDOC REPORT, supra note 196, at 33.
198. NAT’L ASS’N STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2020 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 62, 23 (2020).
199. See Ruth Brown, Newly Released Prisoners Put Strain on Counties; Iinmates Released on
Parole
Cause
Issues
on
County
Level,
IDAHO
PRESS
(Jan.
14,
2017)
https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/newly-released-prisoners-put-strain-oncounties/article_dc3638aa-57a1-5543-bb26-e0f2e487fc01.html (quoting a Canyon County sheriff as
labeling the JRI a “failure across the board”); see also Cory Stambaugh & Joe Andreoli, Opinion, Idaho’s
Early release of ‘Nonviolent’ Offenders, IDAHO STATESMAN
(Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.idahostatesman.com/opinion/article218210750.html (purporting that “JRI is responsible
for 45 percent of the officer-involved fatal incidents in Ada County since 2016”).
200. Betsy Z. Russell, Lawmakers, Law Enforcements Spar over Justice Reinvestment Impacts,
IDAHO PRESS (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/lawmakers-law-enforcementspar-over-justice-reinvestment-impacts/article_7d5609c0-e99c-53a5-a35b-1be879ec59b6.html (State
senator Jim Rice said that Idaho hasn’t yet felt the effects of the JRI because two key projects—hiring
enough parole officer and increasing the amount of community treatment available post-release—have
not yet been achieved).
201. Stambaugh & Andreoli, supra note 199 (describing the JRI as “an ill-conceived and poorly
administered program”).
202.
Support
Fair
Chance
Employment
Legislation,
ACLU
OF
IDAHO,
https://www.acluidaho.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/fce_one-pager_2020.pdf (last visited
Sept. 24, 2021).
203. Id.
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If an Idaho employer chooses to purchase a report of an applicant’s criminal
history from a third-party provider, it must comply with the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”). The FCRA, enacted in 1970, seeks to ensure accuracy, fairness, and
privacy of consumer information maintained by consumer reporting agencies. 204
The FCRA broadly defines a “consumer reporting agency” as any entity that, “for
monetary fees, . . . regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”205 This
includes not only credit bureaus, such as Equifax and Experian, but also commercial
entities offering criminal background reports.206 Therefore, employers who request
criminal background reports on job applicants through a consumer reporting
agency must be mindful of the FCRA.207
Idaho employers purchasing criminal background reports from consumer
reporting agencies must comply with certain requirements designed to protect the
applicant.208 First, employers must notify applicants of their intent to run a
background check, obtain the applicant’s consent of the same, and after receiving
the report, provide the applicant with a copy of the same. 209 Most notably,
employers who reject an applicant based in whole or in part on information
included in her criminal background report must notify her of the same and provide
her with a copy of the report.210
However, Idaho employers need not consult a consumer reporting agency to
obtain an applicant’s rap sheet. Detailed Idaho criminal records are accessible to

204. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (2010).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2010) (emphasis added).
206. See id. § 1681a(d)(1) (defining “consumer report”). A criminal background check qualifies as
a “consumer report” under the FCRA because it is a written communication that bears on a consumer’s
character/general reputation/personal characteristics, and it is prepared for a permissible purpose:
employment. Id.; see also id. § 1681b (listing permissible purposes of consumer reports); BJ Ard, The
Limits of Industry-Specific Privacy Law, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 607, 616 (2015) (explaining that any person
supplying reports for the purpose of evaluating an individual’s employability must be “mindful of the
FCRA”). A few federal circuits—including the Ninth Circuit—have been reluctant to acknowledge the
breadth of this definition. Chi Chi Wu, Data Gatherers Evading the FCRA May Find Themselves Still in Hot
Water, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (June 14, 2019), https://library.nclc.org/data-gatherers-evading-fcra-mayfind-themselves-still-hot-water; see also Zabriskie v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Assoc., 912 F.3d 1192, 1199
(9th Cir. 2019).
207. Ard, supra note 206, at 616.
208. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81t (2010).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 1681m.
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anyone who can pass a CAPTCHA211 on the iCourt Portal.212 The iCourt Portal is an
online judicial record database that publishes all Idaho public court records.213
Members of the public can search for any public court records within seconds by
entering a record number or an individual’s first and last name into iCourt’s “Smart
Search” field.214 The database is updated hourly, and searchers can find records
dating back to 1995.215 Importantly, it appears that the iCourt Portal does not
qualify as a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA.216 First, the Portal does not
charge a monetary fee for its services.217 The FCRA applies only to agencies that
charge monetary fees in exchange for providing consumer reports. 218 The iCourt
Portal’s “Smart Search” function is free to the public.219 Second, the Portal involves
no “third party,”220 as required by the FCRA’s language.221 Whereas a FCRA acts as
a messenger between the federal or state agency and the consumer, iCourt does
away with the messenger by directly providing consumers with public court
records.222 Therefore, searches performed by employers within the iCourt Portal’s
system apparently do not fall within the FCRA’s ambit. Idaho employers armed with
an applicant’s resume can therefore search for an applicant’s criminal record by
simply entering his first and last name in iCourt Portal’s Smart Search bar.223 As
such, Idaho employers can circumvent the FCRA’s notification and consent
requirements with ease by conducting their own search for an applicant’s criminal
record in the iCourt Portal.
If an Idaho employer discriminates against an applicant during the hiring
process, the applicant may seek remedy in Idaho’s courts. To do so, she must first
file an administrative complaint with the Idaho Human Rights Commission

211. Captcha, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/captcha (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021) (A CAPTCHA is “a test to prevent spamming software from accessing a website by
requiring visitors to the site to solve a simple puzzle (typically by reading and transcribing a series of
numbers or letters from a distorted image) in order to gain access.”).
212. See Smart Search, ICOURT, https://mycourts.idaho.gov/odysseyportal/Home/Dashboard/29#
(last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
213. iCourt Portal Overview, ICOURT, https://icourt.idaho.gov/portaloverview (last visited Mar. 2,
2021). The iCourt Portal replaced the Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository, Idaho’s previous online
judicial record system. Id. Starting in 2015, the state transitioned county by county to the modernized
iCourt Portal, eventually completing the transition in 2018. Id.
214. See Smart Search, supra note 212.
215. Public Record Search FAQs, ICOURT, https://icourt.idaho.gov/public (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
216 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81t (2010).
217. See Public Record Search FAQs, supra note 215.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2010).
219. See Public Record Search FAQs, supra note 215; Smart Search, supra note 212. Note that
individuals must pay additional fees if they wish to view certain records. Id.
220. See Public Record Search FAQs, supra note 215.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2010).
222. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81t (2010), with Public Record Search FAQs, supra note 215.
223. See Smart Search, supra note 212.
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(“IHRC”).224 The IHRC is the agency charged with enforcing Title VII claims in
Idaho.225 Filing an administrative complaint with the IHRC is a prerequisite to filing
a civil complaint for employment discrimination in the court.226 Further, individuals
must file an administrative complaint within one year of the discriminatory act. 227
Each administrative complaint is assigned an IHRC investigator who investigates the
claim to determine if probable cause exists.228
Unfortunately, these prerequisite steps likely do little to advance exoffenders’ employment discrimination claims. In 2020, the IHRC made 2,080
“contacts” with Idahoans and fielded roughly 173 intake calls every month.229 Only
358 of these contacts materialized into administrative complaints.230 Moreover, the
IHRC marked 84.9% of these 358 complaints as “resolved” for lack of probable
cause.231 Unless a prospective employer discloses that it rejected an applicant
based on her criminal history, ex-offenders may never learn of the true reason for
their rejection. And without this crucial information, IHRC investigators may
struggle to find discriminatory behavior necessary to file a civil action. Thus, IHRC
complainants likely face evidentiary battles similar those waged in disparate impact
litigation.232
Under the current system, Idaho employers hold all the cards. Although
employers may, out of convenience, request a background check from a consumer
reporting agency—and thus provide certain disclosures and rights to the job
applicant—other options exist. Idaho employers may simply perform an iCourt
search to either intentionally or unintentionally circumvent the FCRA requirements.
Moreover, recourse for applicants experiencing discrimination in the screening
process presents its own evidentiary battle, one that typically begins and ends with
an IHRC administrative complaint. Therefore, Idaho ex-offenders desperately need
protection in the job search if the state seeks to break the cycle of recidivism.
C. The Need for Ban the Box Legislation in Idaho

224. IDAHO CODE § 67-5907 (2010).
225. Id. § 67–5901.
226. Id. § 67–5908(2).
227. Id. § 67–5907(1).
228. Id. § 67–5907(1)–(5).
229. FY 2020 Statistic Measures, IDAHO HUM. RTS. COMM’N 2 (2020),
https://humanrights.idaho.gov/Portals/0/publications/FY2020_Statistic_Measures.pdf
[hereinafter
IHRC Report].
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. For a discussion of disparate impact evidentiary burdens, see supra Part II(B). Note that
individuals who file administrative complaints with the IHRC must fall within a protected class under
Idaho law. IDAHO CODE § 67–5901(2) (2021). Idaho’s protected classes mirror those of Title VII: race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
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In light of Idaho’s growing prison population, the state now stands at a
crossroads: to revisit prison reform alternatives, including the JRI, or to build new
prison facilities. And a permanent solution is long overdue. Idaho’s short-term
solution for overcrowding—transferring Idaho prisoners to out-of-state
facilities233—has become unworkable. Hundreds of Idaho prisoners have been sent
to private, out-of-state prisons in an effort to manage the shortage of beds in Idaho
prisons.234 Housing inmates at these facilities comes at a high cost to taxpayers and
poses safety risks to those transferred.235 In consideration of these mounting costs
and the apparent failure of alternative reform initiatives, many lawmakers have
pledged support to a $500 million prison expansion package, which includes a new
1,510-bed state prison.236 As pressure mounts to solve prison overflow and
recidivism rates, Idaho lawmakers should consider banning the box to reduce,
rather than redirect, the number of Idahoans entering prison.
First, however, it is important to consider the limitations of ban the box
legislation in Idaho. To begin, ban the box legislation alone will not cure Idaho’s
mass incarceration crisis. In fact, any visible change ban-the-box may make on Idaho
imprisonment rates could take years to materialize. Further, the law itself cannot
guarantee compliance. Even if Idaho were to enact a strict ban the box law, it
remains unclear whether employers can circumvent both FCRA requirements and
ban the box requirements by simply running their own search on the iCourt
Portal.237 Ostensibly, performing such a search on iCourt would violate ban the box,
but applicants may find trouble invoking the law if employers do not reveal that
they performed an iCourt search on the applicant’s criminal record. Thus, for the
same reasons that the IHRC rejected 84.9% of the discrimination filings in 2020,238
ex-offenders may still lack “probable cause”—or rather, sufficient evidence—to
bring suit against a prospective employer under a ban the box law.
Other considerations overcome these limitations. To be fair, building a new
prison will surely cure an issue in desperate need of attention: prison overcrowding.
Yet a new prison will do little to curb the state’s growing imprisonment rates. Ban
the box legislation would directly combat prisoner recidivism rather than redirect
recidivists to a new facility. Furthermore, enacting a fair chance law would provide
Idaho ex-offenders more meaningful opportunities in the job market. By extension,

233. BLUEPRINT FOR IDAHO, supra note 177, at 5.
234. BLUEPRINT FOR IDAHO, supra note 177, at 5.
235. BLUEPRINT FOR IDAHO, supra note 177, at 5. Idaho prisoners sent to Eagle Pass Correctional
Facility in Eagle Pass, Texas, have reported “unsafe conditions and inadequate access to medical care
and healthy food.” BLUEPRINT FOR IDAHO, supra note 177, at 5.
236. Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho Looks at Building New State Prison, Spending $500 Million, SPOKESMANREVIEW (June 12, 2018), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/jun/12/idaho-looks-at-buildingnew-state-prison-spending-/.
237. Stacy & Cohen, supra note 42, at 11.
238. IHRC Report, supra note 229, at 2.
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Idaho’s minority population would likely benefit from ban the box legislation given
Idaho’s dramatically high imprisonment rate for people of color.239
A fair chance law would also alleviate the burden the JRI presently places on
post-release operations.240 The JRI relied heavily on parole and probation officer
oversight.241 Many JRI initiatives required parole and probationer officer training
and individualized assessments for each releasee. 242 By contrast, ban the box laws
function independently. A fair chance law requires no training of or oversight from
already-overburdened probation and parole officers. Thus, concerns for
administrative burden in this respect are not present. In fact, the hope is that Idaho
parole and probation officers would also benefit from the ban the box law. Using
Hawaii’s rapidly decreasing recidivism rate as a model,243 Idaho parole and
probation officers’ caseloads may eventually lessen as Idaho’s recidivism rate
begins to fall.
Finally, Idaho’s tax base arguably stands to benefit from ban the box
legislation, too. If lower incarceration rates reduce state correctional spending244
and higher employment rates increase overall income tax contributions,245 the state
stands to benefit financially from banning the box.
The Idaho Legislature should strongly consider enacting statewide ban the box
legislation. While noting that the less-protective Bill 1318 outperformed its 2018
counterpart, Bill 1307, Idaho lawmakers should reconsider a more aggressive fair
chance policy to garner the best possible results. As such, this Comment
recommends that Idaho legislators use the foundations of Hawaii’s successful ban
the box law246 as a guide.
Several key modifications to Senate Bill 1318 deserve consideration. To begin,
both public and private employers should be subject to any future ban the box law.
Lawmakers should also consider delaying inquiry into an applicant’s criminal record
until an interview is scheduled. In the alternative, if no interview is required,
employers should be prohibited from performing a background check until a
conditional job offer has been made. At that time, employers should notify
applicants of their intent to perform a criminal background check. The state should
exempt certain records from consideration, such as arrests not resulting in a
conviction, felonies occurring more than seven years prior, and any conviction that
is unrelated to the position advertised. Applicants should then be afforded the
opportunity to explain any remaining convictions before or during the interview.
239. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS, SENT’G PROJECT
6 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-JusticeRacial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf.
240. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, at 3.
241. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, note 185, at 3.
242. CSG JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 183, note 185, at 3
243. See D’Alessio et al., supra note 143.
244. Nadich, supra note 160, at 773.
245. Atkinson & Lockwood, supra note 154, at 3.
246. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378–2.5 (2020).
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Further, any future Idaho ban the box law should codify the Green factors.
Thus, if an Idaho employer performs a criminal background check on an applicant,
the employer would be required to consider the nature of the non-exempt
conviction, the time elapsed since the conviction, and the nature of the position
advertised. Rejection based on criminal history is then conditioned on the
employer’s objectively reasonable determination that the applicant would pose a
risk to the employer based on these three factors. Finally, Idaho legislators should
consider creating disclosure requirements for employers that reject applicants
based on their criminal record. Employers should be required to promptly notify
the applicant of its employment decision, provide a copy of his or her criminal
record, and specify the information on which it based its decision. This would afford
applicants sufficient evidence to appeal the decision to a regulatory body, such as
the IHRC, if discriminatory practice is at play.
The JRI’s woeful failure likely creates pause for Idaho lawmakers considering
alternative prison reform approaches. Yet legislators should not shy from future
proposed fair chance laws. The state must break from its overreliance on prisons
and consider alternative measures to disrupt the cycle of recidivism. Moreover,
enacting ban the box would provide reentry services where overburdened parole
officers cannot: in the job market. Idaho ex-offenders today are at a significant
disadvantage at every step of the hiring process. Ban the box legislation would level
the playing field by requiring Idaho employers to assess applicants based on their
qualifications, not their criminal record. In turn, Idaho would likely observe
recidivism rates decrease as more ex-offenders find stable employment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the fifty years that have passed since Griggs v. Duke Power Co. was issued,
the disparate impact theory has lost much of its force. Unequal access to evidence
and courts’ growing reluctance to grant relief under this theory have all but
foreclosed this avenue for ex-offenders. In response, state legislatures have
enacted fair chance policies in hopes of affording ex-offenders a fighting chance at
reclaiming their lives after serving their sentences. Though more research is needed
to fully examine the effects of ban the box, recent studies have found that exoffenders are much more likely to find employment in ban the box jurisdictions than
in non-ban the box jurisdictions.247
Idaho ex-offenders receive no comparable protections under state law. In
fact, the current landscape of legal remedies available to Idaho ex-offenders
experiencing hiring discrimination is bleak. The computerization of public court
records and employer-favoring policies in Idaho leaves ex-offenders with slim
chances of securing employment. Idaho’s willingness to enact alternative prison
reform legislation such as the JRI signifies that Idaho legislators are searching for a
solution to the state’s incarceration crisis. Ban the box alone cannot solve this
problem. However, banning the box would likely reduce recidivism and

247. See BERRACASA ET AL., supra note 143, at 16.
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imprisonment rates over time without placing administrative burden on public
correctional employees.
To resist ban the box legislation is to ignore the vicious cycle of recidivism.
Idaho legislators should consider enacting a fair chance law consistent with the
approach proposed above. This approach would ensure that Idaho employers first
consider applicants based on their qualifications and minimize the risk of
unnecessarily rejecting all ex-offenders from consideration. By extension, the
proposed approach will deepen applicant pools and provide ex-offenders a fair
chance at employment—and life—after serving their sentences.

